The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord was signed as a commitment to progress. The conflict in the CHT region was primarily political, not just centered on land or ethnicity. Initially, the movement led by the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) employed non-violent strategies. However, when peaceful avenues were obstructed, an armed resistance emerged. Despite this, the door for dialogue remained open.
Following 26 formal negotiation rounds—six with the Ershad government, 13 with Khaleda Zia’s BNP, and seven with Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League—the CHT accord was finally agreed upon on December 2, 1997.
The signing of the accord marked a significant milestone. Weapons were relinquished, instilling hope in the hills. The accord pledged to recognize the CHT as a distinct indigenous area, delegate power to local councils, end military supervision, facilitate the return of dispossessed land through an operational land commission, among other commitments.
Over 27 years later, the implementation of the accord is marred by incomplete truths and selective memory.
While the former Awami League government claimed to have “fully implemented” 65 out of 72 sections of the accord and partially completed three others, the PCJSS, a signatory to the accord, contends that only 25 sections have been genuinely fulfilled. Furthermore, 29 sections have been disregarded and breached. Eighteen sections have only been partially executed. The disparity between the official government stance and the actual situation on the ground has not only raised political concerns but has also undermined trust among the population in the CHT.
Under the accord, various key responsibilities were to be transferred to the hill district councils, including maintaining law and order, managing land administration, overseeing local policing, forest and environmental management, and developing communication infrastructure. Despite the former government’s claim of “full implementation,” these transfers remain largely unmet in practice. Hill district councils face marginalization, inadequate funding, and political manipulation.
The land commission, tasked with resolving prolonged land disputes between indigenous communities and Bangalees residing in the region, lacks the resources and political determination to fulfill its mandate. Of the 26,000 land-related applications submitted, none have been resolved. A scheduled meeting of the commission in 2022 was canceled due to pressure from Bangalee groups.
Even the committee responsible for monitoring the accord’s implementation lacks essential resources, including an office, staff, and budget.
During its tenure, the Awami League government failed to uphold the core promises of the accord, resorting to stalling and selective interpretation to retain control while appearing compliant. From 2014 onwards, the stagnation became increasingly apparent. Despite government reports showcasing numerical accomplishments, the ground reality painted a different picture. The institutions established under the accord have transformed into tools for political appointments rather than platforms for change. Instead of being a blueprint for pluralism, decentralization, inclusion, and justice, the accord has become a cautionary tale of how good intentions can deteriorate when promises are left unfulfilled in bureaucratic processes.
With Bangladesh at a political crossroads following substantial student-led protests and civic unrest that led to a change in government, there is an opportunity to rectify past shortcomings and honor the 1997 agreement in both policy and practice.
The government has formed a three-member Implementation and Monitoring Committee to oversee the long-delayed implementation of the CHT Accord. Led by Foreign Affairs Adviser M Touhid Hossain as convener, with PCJSS President Santu Larma and Tribal Refugee Affairs Taskforce chair Sudatta Chakma as members, the committee was established on January 12. Its responsibilities include supervising implementation efforts, coordinating relevant government bodies, addressing pending issues, offering policy recommendations, overseeing refugee repatriation and rehabilitation, and forming sub-committees as needed for effective execution of the accord’s provisions. However, a clear, time-bound roadmap is essential to address the unmet provisions.
The implementation of the accord is not merely a gesture of goodwill but a duty. It is a binding agreement, not a concession.
During a recent discussion in Dhaka organized by the Bangladesh Indigenous Peoples’ Forum, indigenous leaders and civil society groups urged the interim government to promptly engage in dialogue with the PCJSS and other stakeholders to advance the stagnant implementation of the CHT Accord. They emphasized the urgent need to activate the Land Dispute Resolution Commission, reform flawed legal frameworks, and ensure the democratic functioning of institutions established under the accord. Participants expressed frustration over governmental inaction and neglect, underscoring the necessity for a clear roadmap to restore peace and justice in the hills.
The CHT Accord began with optimism but has since encountered detours and obstacles. However, the people in the CHT have not forgotten. The accord endures—in forgotten files, in the youth born post-1997, and in the collective memory of a